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ABSTRACT 
 The National Incident Management System (NIMS) guidance strategy influences 
local public safety organizations and jurisdictions with emergency response obligations to 
develop and adopt all-hazards emergency response plans to prepare for critical incidents 
and natural disasters. Plan developers use assumption-based planning to imagine disaster 
scenarios and cultivate response options, but there are inherent problems with using such 
an approach for emergency preparedness. This thesis reviews the literature regarding 
NIMS strategy for incident response, assumption-based and adaptive planning processes, 
complexity and decision-making, and response implementation to determine whether a 
shift in policy could benefit local responders. It also covers four response case 
after-action reports to determine whether pre-incident plans were beneficial to responders 
and if jurisdictions had sufficient resources to respond to their incidents. The review 
illustrates that assumption-based planning is not the best tool for developing new plans 
but is better suited to review existing procedures or as a training tool for responders. This 
thesis shows that pre-selected and trained incident management teams provide superior 
preparedness for response and, when combined with a decision-making framework, are a 
dynamic, efficient tool. This thesis recommends changing the national strategy to 
influence local authorities in the development and implementation of coordinated local 
incident response teams. 
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This thesis presents a qualitative analysis of the current state of guidance provided 
by the federal government to state and local emergency response jurisdictions. The federal 
government drives a national incident management strategy by defining several categories 
that address response expectations for stakeholders: incident management, legal authority, 
funding, recovery, plans, policies, and procedures, among others. The national strategy, 
which comprises several documents, consolidates many plans, policies, and directives to 
influence local and state-level decision-makers through grant funding and post-disaster 
reimbursement. The federal funding process motivates jurisdictions to comply, and some 
specific sectors, such as critical infrastructure, dictate compliance through legislation.  
The National Incident Management System’s strategy influences local 
organizations and jurisdictions with emergency response obligations to develop and adopt 
all-hazards emergency response plans to prepare for critical incidents and natural disaster 
responses. Plan developers use an assumption-based planning approach to imagine 
catastrophic scenarios and cultivate response options, but there are inherent problems with 
such an approach for emergency response.  
This thesis reviews the literature regarding the national incident management 
strategy for incident response, assumption-based and adaptive planning processes, 
complexity and decision-making, and response implementation to determine whether a 
shift in the national policy could benefit local responders. The literature review ultimately 
illustrates that assumption-based planning is not an appropriate tool for developing new 
plans but is better suited to review existing procedures or as a training tool for responders.  
This thesis also presents four response case after-action reports to determine 
whether pre-incident plans were beneficial to responders and jurisdictions had sufficient 
resources to respond to their incidents. The research design followed the model described 
by Kathleen Eisenhardt in her 1989 journal article, “Building Theories from Case Study 
xvi 
Research.”1 Each case selected was analyzed through the lenses of federal guidance, 
planning, complexity and decision-making, and implementation of the response. The study 
was conducted in a structured educational environment to satisfy the requirements of a 
master’s degree program. 
The case studies indicate that pre-incident plans had little effect on the outcomes of 
each situation—although a team of responders was required to manage impacts and find 
solutions. In the City of Austin’s case, the emergency operations plan provided no response 
direction, and the one pre-existing plan, for point-of-distribution operations, remained 
unused. For Austin Water and the City of Evans, an incident management team (IMT) 
provided direct response coordination and managed overall response operations. For the 
City of Westport, responders acted as an ad hoc IMT.  
The cases reviewed do not, however, refute all value attributed to pre-incident 
planning. Jurisdictions should conduct assumption-based planning for understanding the 
potential risks associated with their locations and services. All-hazards pre-incident plans 
aid the development of their response capabilities and should be used for training and 
exercising coordinated response teams. Teams can use scenario-based procedures as 
learning tools, exercising responses to simulated disaster conditions.  
This thesis shows that pre-selected and pre-trained IMTs provide superior 
preparedness for disaster response and, when combined with a decision-making 
framework, are a dynamic, efficient tool. The analysis is an amalgam of the author’s 
experiences and theories, shaped by the reviews of current literature and case studies.  
A change in the national strategy, from a focus on assumption-based planning to 
advocate for the development of local IMTs, would provide a mechanism for agencies and 
jurisdictions to respond. Local response teams that train and exercise together would 
provide the foundation for improved response efforts. The goal is not to eliminate pre-
incident planning but to synthesize it with established local response teams—preferably, 
                                                 
1 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, “Building Theories from Case Study Research,” Academy of Management 
Review 14, no. 4 (1989): 532–50, https://doi.org/10.2307/258557. 
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teams that have a working understanding of complex problem-solving, as presented within 
the Cynefin framework.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Public safety and emergency response agencies across the country must ready 
themselves for disaster response. Fifty states and some sixteen non-state territories—
comprising more than 3,000 counties and 600+ cities with populations higher than 
50,000—make up the United States.1 Residents in each of those locations generally expect 
their local, state, and federal governments to react quickly and effectively in response to 
threats, crises, and disasters. Many governmental entities, including typical public safety 
organizations such as police, fire, and emergency medical services, respond during those 
emergencies; however, others such as emergency management agencies, public utilities, 
public health agencies, volunteer groups, and other vital partners with service 
responsibilities also play a role. The overarching strategy that guides response efforts is the 
National Incident Management System’s “whole of community” concept.2  
The federal government drives a national incident management strategy by defining 
several categories that address response expectations for stakeholders: incident 
management, legal authority, funding, recovery, plans, policies, and procedures, among 
others. The national strategy, which comprises several documents, consolidates many 
plans, policies, and directives to influence local and state-level decision-makers through 
grant funding and post-disaster reimbursement. The federal funding process motivates 
jurisdictions to comply, and some specific sectors, such as critical infrastructure, dictate 
compliance through legislation.  
The preparedness strategy of developing assumption-based all-hazards emergency 
response plans, as strategic guidance for response stakeholders, does not adequately ensure 
a capacity to respond. These plans provide pre-identified response options that direct 
                                                 
1 “Population, Population Change, and Estimated Components of Population Change: April 1, 2010, to 
July 1, 2018,” U.S. Census Bureau, accessed October 30, 2020, https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/time-
series/demo/popest/2010s-counties-total.html. 
2 Department of Homeland Security, National Prevention Framework, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2016), 22, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1466017209279-
83b72d5959787995794c0874095500b1/National_Prevention_Framework2nd.pdf. 
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emergency responders in real situations and use hypothetical conditions or facts from past 
incidents to direct future decisions. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
pre-identifies threat conditions for which stakeholders develop ERPs, such as floods, 
wildfires, tornadoes, or terrorist attacks. However, it does not ensure that all response 
agencies are well coordinated or experienced in working together to resolve issues. 
Moreover, mandatory assumption-based plans cannot verify a given jurisdiction’s capacity 
to implement such specific incident response.  
The ERP strategy may also overestimate the value of assumption-based plans as 
effective guidance, and it fails to provide a mechanism to implement any given plan. The 
planning principles used to develop an ERP assume the parameters of a hypothetical 
scenario and provide detailed narrative response strategies based on those assumptions. 
The imagined scenarios rarely occur as planned during actual incidents, and in my 
experience, few responders ever refer to pre-written plans during a response. Long-term 
strategic planning for conditions divorced from reality fails to provide sufficient answers 
for complex incidents and generates motivational slogans more effectively than it does 
direct response efforts. Completing required pre-incident plans seems more effective at 
checking a regulatory box than it does for providing competent response guidance.  
The overall value of ERPs rests, more heavily, in their ability to train and exercise 
response teams in preparation for disasters. I am not aware of any reliable metrics currently 
available to measure a selected jurisdiction’s ability to implement a particular plan in any 
given situation. The generally accepted mark is something akin to declaring the jurisdiction 
has or has not developed an ERP. The pre-incident, hypothetical planning approach cannot 
possibly account for every condition that responders may encounter during an emergency. 
Even if a plan contained all of the appropriate response options, a given jurisdiction might 
not have enough experienced personnel, the proper equipment, or any number of other 
resources necessary to accomplish the plan as imagined before the incident.  
Applying pre-defined best-practice solutions can create problems in situations 
where “good” or “novel” approaches, as discussed later, may be superior. Pre-written plans 
can become ineffective as specific scenario conditions change, or if response leaders fail 
to review them during a response. The plans themselves rarely offer contingencies or 
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guidance on how to assess the many situational variances typically encountered. 
Responders must weigh actual conditions and apply strategies based on their own 
experiences and capabilities.  
More flexible and adaptive strategies—combined with a mechanism for 
implementation and sound decision-making principles—may offer significant positive 
impacts and improvements for stakeholders with emergency services responsibilities. This 
thesis analyzes the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and assumption-based 
strategic planning principles to determine the proper value of all-hazards pre-incident 
planning, identify improvements in response capabilities, and make policy 
recommendations for future consideration.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In my more than three decades of emergency response experience, I have never 
searched for the written plan during an emergency response. Only when I worked with 
nuclear weapons did I serve in an organization that committed sufficient time and resources 
to training and drills, using pre-incident processes for a response. In my law enforcement 
and nursing practice, responders needed to be flexible and must have response strategies 
in mind. When lives are on the line, there is little time to consult the rule book.  
The players of every sport must know the rules before they play, but do not carry 
the rules with them on the field. Plays develop quickly, and players react with the skills 
they have learned well before the game starts. Coaches and managers develop strategies to 
win in the off-season, and then implement those concepts during actual games. My 
experience has led me to the theory that the implied approach of NIMS relies too heavily 
on assumption-based, pre-incident planning for the basis of actual emergency response—
that an extensive, detailed plan based on assumptions does not adequately prepare 
jurisdictions to respond. It is as if the system relies more heavily on the book of plays than 
on having an organized team of players.  
I also believe the strategy does not ask jurisdictions to have a structured mechanism 
for implementing coordinated, multi-agency, or multi-jurisdictional plans. It does not tell 
jurisdictions or departments to form a team. It assumes that response stakeholders will 
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come together during chaotic and stressful emergencies and synthesize effectively. Local 
law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services, public works, public health, and other 
agencies are not required to develop coordinated mechanisms capable of implementing 
detailed, integrated critical incident response plans across agency lines. This thesis attempts 
to determine how federal guidance affects preparedness and the ability of local jurisdictions 
to respond and seeks to identify a strategy that could enhance local response capabilities.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. How does federal guidance for crisis response planning influence local 
and state preparedness? 
2. Can a shift in planning strategy improve crisis response preparedness?  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis presents a qualitative review of case studies, utilizing both a participant-
observer viewpoint and analysis of archival reports. To conduct this study, I reviewed 
current literature, governmental policies and directives, and federal law influencing and 
directing the use of all-hazard ERPs, as well as after-action reports from natural disaster 
incidents for comparative analysis. The research design followed the model described by 
Kathleen Eisenhardt in her 1989 journal article, “Building Theories from Case Study 
Research.”3 Each case selected was analyzed through the lenses of federal guidance, 
planning, complexity and decision-making, and implementation of the response. The study 
was conducted in a structured educational environment to satisfy the requirements of a 
master’s degree program. 
Based on my own experiences, I selected three cases for review, one having two 
respondent perspectives from the same flooding incident, which I believe provided relevant 
comparative value. In full disclosure, I participated in the episode reviewed in that case, 
serving as the emergency management coordinator for Austin Water during the 2018 
Colorado River flood. Given the potential for bias in evaluating these incidents, I strove to 
                                                 
3 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, “Building Theories from Case Study Research,” Academy of Management 
Review 14, no. 4 (1989): 532–50, https://doi.org/10.2307/258557. 
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remain as objective as possible in this review. I also selected two other archival reports 
from incidents outside my personal experience, from different geographical locations in 
the United States, involving weather-related disasters that had publicly available after-
action reviews.  
This thesis is limited to the written documents available for analysis. I have not 
conducted personal interviews or surveys, and all observations I make are recalled from 
memory of the events as they happened. I use the literature reviewed as a schema for 
analyzing each incident. The purpose of the literature review, in Chapter II, is to determine 
how federal guidance affects state and local preparedness, and whether additional guidance 
might improve response capabilities.  
  
6 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review addresses four areas of research related to the national 
incident management strategy. The first section addresses research on federal policies and 
other literature, which influence and guide emergency management and incident response. 
The second section compares assumption-based planning with adaptive planning 
principles, contrasting the two perspectives used commonly for preparedness and response. 
The third section covers complexity and decision-making in incident management and 
defines operational domains in which leaders make decisions. The final field examines 
incident management teams as the mechanism for implementing plans during critical 
incident response, distinguishing incident management teams as the benchmark for 
response application. These four areas were selected because they are foundational in 
addressing the challenges faced during consequential disasters. The four research areas 
affect all critical incidents, whether deliberate acts or natural occurrences, encompassing 
preparedness, planning, decision-making, and implementation. 
A. FEDERAL GUIDANCE 
According to an October 10, 2017, memorandum from acting Secretary of 
Homeland Security Elaine C. Duke, NIMS arose from a desire to provide a national 
response template for all stakeholders with emergency service responsibilities, considering 
neither the cause nor complexity of the incident nor the size and location of the 
organization.4 Promulgated by FEMA, NIMS represents the overarching guidance for all 
event and incident planning but does not constitute a response plan in itself. The NIMS 
approach is broad guidance that applies to all governmental, non-governmental, and private 
entities involved with emergency planning and response.5  
                                                 
4 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System, 3rd ed. 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2017), 133, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/1508151197225-ced8c60378c3936adb92c1a3ee6f6564/FINAL_NIMS_2017.pdf. 
5 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1. 
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A set of principles within the system directs the actions of emergency mitigation, 
preparation, response, and recovery. The doctrine includes situational flexibility, 
standardization of terms and structures, unity of effort toward a common set of goals, 
command and coordination during activations, resource management, express information 
sharing, and pre-incident response planning. NIMS propositions allow for variances in the 
scale of operations and adaptations to specific conditions within a given incident or event.6 
NIMS builds on the foundation of several relevant laws and supporting documents. 
Key among them include the Homeland Security Act of 2002; Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 5, Management of Domestic Incidents; Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 
Protection; Presidential Policy Directive 8, National Preparedness; America’s Water 
Infrastructure Act of 2018; the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101; and 
Introduction to the Incident Command System.  
State, local, and tribal reliance on federal funding—in the form of either pre-
incident grants or post-incident reimbursements—spurs compliance with NIMS. The 
Emergency Management Performance Grant, the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 
Grant Program, and the Urban Area Security Initiative grants represent just a few of the 
many awards available to qualified entities that follow the recommendations of the national 
incident management strategy.7  
Through grants, a national infrastructure protection plan, and specific U.S. laws, 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) directs the national incident management 
strategy.8 One such code is the America’s Water Infrastructure Act of 2018, which requires 
that all producers of potable drinking water within the United States conduct vulnerability 
assessments for natural and human made threats and then develop all-hazards ERPs on or 
                                                 
6 Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
7 George D. Haddow, Jane A. Bullock, and Damon P. Coppola, Introduction to Emergency 
Management, 4th ed. (Burlington, MA: Butterworth Heinemann, 2011). 
8 James Jay Carafano and Weitz, Richard, “Complex Systems Analysis—A Necessary Tool for 
Homeland Security,” Backgrounder, no. 2261 (April 16, 2009): 4, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5beb/
3f8ea626889e23f05452f24c5fb7dd84272e.pdf. 
9 
before September 30, 2020.9 Some deliverable dates have changed based on the size of the 
utility and the number of customers it serves; however, the September 2020 deadline is the 
stated target date.  
The Act’s language states that utilities must integrate the findings they produce 
from completed vulnerability assessments, and all plans shall include the following: 
(1) strategies and resources to improve the resilience of the system, 
including the physical security and cybersecurity of the system; 
(2) plans and procedures that can be implemented, and identification of 
equipment that can be utilized, in the event of a malevolent act or natural 
hazard that threatens the ability of the community water system to deliver 
safe drinking water; 
(3) actions, procedures, and equipment which can obviate or significantly 
lessen the impact of a malevolent act or natural hazard on the public health 
and the safety and supply of drinking water provided to communities and 
individuals, including the development of alternative source water options, 
relocation of water intakes, and construction of flood protection barriers; 
and 
(4) . . . strategies that can be used to aid in the detection of malevolent acts 
or natural hazards that threaten the security or resilience of the system.10  
This law also directs utilities to coordinate with local emergency planning committees 
when developing their ERPs and requires operators to certify their plans upon completion. 
Following initial certification, plans are reviewed, revised as necessary, and re-certified 
every five years.11 The Environmental Protection Agency provides a template for plan 
development, consistent with guidance from the CPG 101.  
Other guiding laws include the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which designates 
DHS as a stand-alone, cabinet-level agency with specific homeland security duties.12 
                                                 
9 America’s Water Infrastructure Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–270, 132 Stat. 3765 (2018), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3021/text. 
10 America’s Water Infrastructure Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–270, 132 Stat. 3852. 
11 America’s Water Infrastructure Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–270, 132 Stat. 3850. 
12 “Creation of the Department of Homeland Security,” Department of Homeland Security, September 
24, 2015, https://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security. 
10 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 establishes NIMS as the federal standard for 
domestic incident response and designates DHS as the agency responsible for 
administering NIMS.13 
The CPG 101 provides general and detailed guidance for all stakeholders having 
planning responsibilities. The guide identifies risk-informed planning and a routine, 
generally accepted planning practice as core functions.14 Whole-community planning—or 
the integration of participants including first responders, non-governmental partners, 
utilities, volunteers, and others—is a leading concept of pre-incident planning. However, 
this guide offers no mechanism for implementing developed plans other than 
communicating the need for collaboration. Furthermore, it does not compel local 
authorities, law enforcement, fire departments, emergency medical service (EMS) 
agencies, public health departments, and other stakeholders to develop coordinated 
response teams. Even in normal responses, some jurisdictions work poorly together.15 In 
other areas, response partners can cultivate well-integrated relationships.  
The CPG 101 advocates planning based on risk analysis.16 Assumption-based 
planning (ABP) is a process whereby plan developers assume a potential risk for the 
express purpose of developing response options.17 In ABP, planners identify potential 
hazards by consulting lists of possible and probable threats and then assuming threat 
                                                 
13 George W. Bush, Management of Domestic Incidents, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 
(Washington, DC: White House, 2003), https://www.dhs.gov/publication/homeland-security-presidential-
directive-5. 
14 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations 
Plans: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, version 2.0 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, 2010), intro-1, https://www.ready.gov/sites/default/files/2019-06/comprehensive_preparedness_
guide_developing_and_maintaining_emergency_operations_plans.pdf. 
15 Gregoire v. Cal. Highway Patrol, No. 14CV1749-GPC(DHB) (S.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016), 
https://www.leagle.com/decision/infdco20160218a18. 
16 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, 1. 
17 James A. Dewar, Assumption-Based Planning: A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises, RAND 
Studies in Policy Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), xiii. 
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conditions exist for plan development. Planners conduct vulnerability assessments based 
on the assumption of the risk and plan response activities accordingly (see Table 1).18  
Table 1. Sample Hazards List19 




• Disease epidemic 
• Flood 
• Hurricane 
• Tornado  
• Tsunami 
• Volcanic eruption 
• Wildfire 
• Winter storm 
• Airplane crash 
• Dam/levee failure 
• Hazmat release 
• Power failure 
• Radiological release 
• Train derailment 
• Urban wildfire  
• Civil disturbance 
• Cyber attack 
• Terrorist act 
• Sabotage 
• Active shooter 
 
Planners advance scenarios to identify risks associated with the general hazard and 
anticipate implications for the planning entity. By creating assumptions, situations present 
different challenges that specific response options address.  
B. PLANNING 
Thorough, systematic planning, while historically associated with military 
engagements, is ever more common in business and governmental endeavors, referred to 
as strategic planning. Although heavily used in the private sector for decades, strategic 
planning in the public sector of government became mainstream in the 1980s.20 
Organizations embraced strategic planning to drive their decision-making, specifically 
concerning the mission, motive, and method of achieving established goals. Bryson, 
Edwards, and Van Slyke detail the forms of strategic planning, which takes one of two 
approaches: root or branch. They point out, “Strategic planning is not a single thing, but 
                                                 
18 Dewar, 1. 
19 Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, 4–10. 
20 John M. Bryson, Lauren Hamilton Edwards, and David M. Van Slyke, “Getting Strategic about 
Strategic Planning Research,” Public Management Review 20, no. 3 (2018): 317–39, https://doi.org/10.
1080/14719037.2017.1285111. 
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instead consists of a set of concepts, procedures, tools, and practices that combine in 
different manners to create a variety of approaches to being strategic” (original 
emphasis).21 Although many approaches to strategic planning exist, the homeland security 
practice has generally adopted the assumption-based path.  
Developed in 1987 by James A. Dewar and Morlie H. Levin at RAND Corporation, 
ABP set out to help the U.S. Army with its strategic planning process during quickly 
evolving times.22 ABP enhanced accountability and encouraged iteration in plan 
development. It assumed conditions in specific scenarios and cultivated alternative 
outcomes by applying various response actions. 
Dewar describes five basic steps in applying the ABP approach to the planning 
process.23 First, identify assumptions in existing plans or plans in the development process. 
Then, identify the “load-bearing” assumptions or those assumptions with the most 
significant ability to impact success or defeat. Third, identify “sign-posts” that indicate a 
broken or weak belief. Sign-posts are events or thresholds that, if detected, alert the planner 
to potential failure. In the fourth step, the planner develops alternative and optional actions 
to influence the course of events. Dewar calls these “shaping-actions,” defining them as 
those which induce a particular outcome. The final step is developing “hedging-actions.” 
Such contingency actions move the scenario in a completely different direction (see Figure 
1). Essentially, this process leads the planner through a series of “if this, then this” 
algorithms that explore endless possibilities of conditional variables. 
                                                 
21 Bryson, Edwards, and Van Slyke, 320. 
22 Dewar, Assumption-Based Planning, xiii. 
23 Dewar, 2–3. 
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Figure 1. Steps in Assumption-Based Planning24 
The five-step process seems to present some challenges for the planning 
practitioner. Although I have been involved in emergency planning for more than three 
decades, I only discovered these detailed instructions while researching this thesis. Most 
practitioners, one might presume, could not define these five steps, nor the detail involved 
in determining specificities such as load-bearing assumptions, sign-posts, shaping-actions, 
and hedging-actions. The formality of the process makes it a challenging endeavor to 
prescribe as a nationwide strategy and might be a detractor for ABP.  
Dewar describes many strengths in the ABP process. The system addresses threats 
effectively and systematically spawns alternative scenarios for consideration, but its chief 
advantage lies in iteration when planning for uncertainty.25 It encourages practicing 
scenario problem-solving again and again, over time. He submits that unpredictability and 
uncertainty require flexibility in planning; however, he cautions that this process may be a 
net weakness because considering the infinite possibilities in disaster and emergency 
                                                 
24 Source: Dewar, Assumption-Based Planning, 11. 
25 Dewar, Assumption-Based Planning, 10. 
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response seems unwieldy, if not impossible. By asserting that scenario development is 
systematic and that ABP ties actions directly to assumptions, he also suggests this process 
tends to create fragmented options more than complete plans. Thus, this technique is likely 
better for reviewing existing plans and enhancing training and exercises than as an engine 
for final resolution. I believe this is a crucial mistake made by homeland security and 
incident response planners: they accept the shaping-actions of ABP as actual response 
actions for a given disaster instead of viewing them as training tools. Moreover, ABP is 
not particularly helpful in developing plans from scratch.26 It favors the review and 
revision of existing plans over the creation of new ones. The planning process stands apart 
from the end product. Although it may seem minor, this distinction is crucial because it 
addresses testing versus development.  
In 1957, speaking at a national conference, President Dwight Eisenhower said, 
“Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.”27 The process of planning, reviewing 
situations, and potential circumstances have tremendous value, but the significance of the 
plans themselves are undetermined until an outcome is known. According to Dewar, few 
evaluative systems allow for reviewing the effectiveness of strategic plans.28 Bryson, 
Edwards, and Van Slyke also note that studies of strategic planning tend to show a 
correlation between planning and achieved outcomes. However, that correlation leans 
toward being perceptual because of the difficulties associated with evaluating public-sector 
performance.29  
In his 1994 Harvard Business Review article, “The Fall and Rise of Strategic 
Planning,” Henry Mintzberg highlights the fallacies associated with strategic planning.30 
Prediction is difficult when complexity creates incalculable outcomes. Even if a given 
                                                 
26 Dewar, 11. 
27 “The Eisenhowers: Quotes,” Eisenhower Presidential Library, accessed October 30, 2020, 
https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/eisenhowers/quotes. 
28 Dewar, Assumption-Based Planning, 11. 
29 Bryson, Edwards, and Van Slyke, “Getting Strategic about Strategic Planning Research,” 330. 
30 Henry Mintzberg, “The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning,” Harvard Business Review, January–
February 1994, 110. 
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situation can be assumed, which is arduous in the all-hazards framework of emergency 
response planning, the timing, location, and magnitude of an incident are impossible to 
guess accurately. Planners fall prey to availability bias, when they can only perceive the 
worst thing they have ever experienced.31 The range of possible outcomes covers only 
what is known, making it very difficult to imagine an actual worst-case scenario. The bias 
does not merely apply to planners either. Decision- and policy-makers who review and 
approve plans and responses do so only within the possibilities available to them through 
their own experiences.  
Mintzberg also discusses the fallacy of formalization. He claims that little proof 
exists that structured systems produce better results than do human beings, because systems 
cannot take in, comprehend, and synthesize information.32 Furthermore, he says, “In a 
literal sense, planning cannot learn.”33 An all-hazards plan is not capable of adapting to 
the varied conditions experienced in dynamic critical incidents. The effectiveness of a plan 
lies in its ability to guide performance, but it cannot become so large and unwieldy that its 
use during a response becomes unlikely. This concept seems to suggest, again, that the best 
use of ABP is as a tool for teaching and exercising responders’ capabilities.  
Strategic planners typically use a calculating style of management, as opposed to a 
committing style.34 Henry Mintzberg writes in his classic article that the committed style 
leads people on a journey where leadership guides the process, raising the enthusiasm of 
employees as all proceed. Calculation fixates on destination or outcome without concern 
for variables like preference or capability, which inherently diminishes the value of that 
style of planning.35 Are there different approaches, then, that might be better suited for the 
needs associated with incident and disaster response? Innovative planning practices have 
flourished in the fast-paced environment of business and technology.  
                                                 
31 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 135. 
32 Mintzberg, “The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning,” 111. 
33 Mintzberg, 111. 
34 Mintzberg, 109. 
35 Mintzberg, 109. 
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Lean principles—flexible and rapidly adaptive techniques for addressing 
unknowns—drive start-ups, top-performing companies, and organizations worldwide. “A 
start-up is a human institution designed to create a new product or service under conditions 
of extreme uncertainty,” writes Eric Ries.36 The lean principles discussed in his book offer 
an alternative approach to the historically accepted practices of long-term strategic business 
planning. “Lean” now signifies the entrepreneurial approach to business management and 
describes a process for innovation and disruption in markets, be they business, non-profits, 
or government.37 Lean relies on a doctrine of “build-measure-learn” to promote situational 
awareness, flexibility, and adaptability as a tenet for successful management. Emergency 
management and public safety leaders are very much like entrepreneurs—managing the 
unknowns associated with incident and disaster response—and, as such, should consider 
the lean approach. However, how does lean apply to homeland security? 
Lean start-up identifies fundamental concepts in its managerial framework. The 
first is that entrepreneurs exist in all facets of business, including the public and private 
sectors, implying that homeland security professionals are entrepreneurs. Second, 
entrepreneurship is management, especially in ever-changing and unpredictable settings. 
Third, managers should employ the build-measure-learn model described in lean start-up 
and validate their learning with empirical data. Lastly, managers should achieve 
accountability by measuring real progress with benchmarking that avoids vanity metrics, 
those indicators that point only to positive achievements. All outcomes, both the positive 
and the negative, must be measured to understand how performance influences outcomes.  
One example of entrepreneurship in the government is delivering dynamic and 
effective response services during critical incidents. Homeland security responders and 
emergency managers address emerging and often poorly understood problems in real time. 
They must be able to build a response, measure the effectiveness of their actions, and learn 
from the empirical data that their efforts produce. Mintzberg would likely agree with this 
                                                 
36 Eric Ries, The Lean Startup: How Today’s Entrepreneurs Use Continuous Innovation to Create 
Radically Successful Businesses (New York: Crown Publishing, 2011), 27. 
37 Ries, 29. 
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theory, writing that “sometimes strategies must be as broad visions, and not precisely 
articulated, to allow adaptations for a changing environment.”38 
C. COMPLEXITY AND DECISION-MAKING 
During emergencies, responders and managers operate in multiple domains with 
varying degrees of difficulty or complexity. Every disaster is different, and every reaction 
is as well. Understanding those differences in applying solutions is critical for effective 
response and recovery. One tool for helping decision-makers understand the domain in 
which they are operating, and guiding them in deploying effective solutions, is the Cynefin 
framework. 
Cynefin is a contextual framework based on complexity science, which explores 
the challenges that decision-makers confront by defining relationships between cause and 
effect.39 It is five conceptual domains—obvious, complicated, complex, chaotic, and 
disorder—allow a decision-maker to understand more fully the domain within which one 
operates, and which type of solution might best lead to positive outcomes. By recognizing 
the correct domain, the decision-maker can choose an appropriate response strategy in real 
time. As complexity shifts, so too can response options (see Figure 2). 
                                                 
38 Mintzberg, “The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning,” 112. 
39 David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard 
Business Review, November 2007. 
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Figure 2. The Cynefin Framework40 
In the obvious domain, cause and effect are generally evident. An indication of 
operations in the obvious domain, defined by a “sense-categorize-respond” dynamic, is a 
stable and apparent relationship between what has occurred and how to solve the issue.41 
Responders apply “best practices” to the problem for an expected outcome.42 For example, 
when firefighters respond to a common dumpster fire, using water is the best practice 
nationwide and the accepted course of action. This approach is sufficient and generally 
accepted by all who would respond in a similar situation.  
One noted challenge of the obvious domain is the potential for complacency. When 
responders encounter obvious situations repeatedly, and accepted solutions are applied 
effectively over time, complacency may arise. The threat with complacency is that the 
situation might be misunderstood as simple when, in fact, it is not. This boundary, 
described as the complacency cliff, indicates the ease with which an issue can rapidly 
                                                 
40 Source: David Snowden, “Cynefin St David’s Day 2019 (1 of 5),” Cognitive Edge (blog), March 5, 
2019, https://www.cognitive-edge.com/cynefin-as-of-st-davids-day-2019/. Used with permission from the 
author, received September 20, 2020. 
41 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 1–2. 
42 Snowden and Boone, 2. 
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become chaotic if responders are not aware of the problem soon enough. In that case, a 
best practice is not appropriate, and complexity may amplify the potential for adverse 
outcomes. Decision-makers must also avoid what Snowden and Boone call “entrained” 
thinking. Commanders can become so accustomed to reacting habitually that they fail to 
consider new perspectives, approaches, or ideas.43 Because leaders may fail to notice that, 
the situation is becoming more complicated, they should encourage dissent and differing 
views from others in the response.44 
As cause and effect become less apparent, and when it takes either time for analysis 
or specific expertise to recognize the context of the incident, responders are operating in 
the complicated domain. As difficulty increases, the scenario must be analyzed carefully 
to determine an appropriate resolution. This “sense-analyze-respond” dynamic often leads 
to “good-practice” solutions.45 Leaders must learn to listen to experts offering their input 
while also receiving ideas from others. Expertise in one field may transfer into unrelated 
specialties and provide unique approaches to problems. 
Progression through the framework leads from complicated to complex. In the 
complex domain, novel situations are made manifest in emergence—unpredictable patterns 
that exceed the sum of their parts, whose possible solutions cannot be anticipated. Snowden 
and Boone detail complexity’s “probe-sense-respond” dynamic: leaders first probe with 
safe-to-fail experiments, but then as they apply novel approaches, they must put in place 
amplifying and dampening controls to alter the trials based on observed results.46 In 
complexity, leaders cannot impose solutions because the total implications are unknown.47 
Open communication and resource sharing are crucial to success when solving complex 
problems because experimentation is resource-intensive and immediate feedback provides 
maximum control. 
                                                 
43 Snowden and Boone, 2. 
44 Snowden and Boone, 3.  
45 Snowden and Boone, 3.  
46 Snowden and Boone, 3. 
47 Snowden and Boone, 4. 
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In the initial phase of an emergency response, leaders often encounter the chaotic 
domain. Chaos is that space in which looking for correct answers is ineffective.48 For 
example, stopping a bleed—not discussing the pros and cons of safety measures or 
protective equipment—is the imminent action. Chaos dictates that an action comes first, 
then awareness, and then a measured response. Snowden and Boone describe this dynamic 
as “act-sense-respond.”49 Notably, there are no prescribed steps for intervention in a 
chaotic circumstance. As in the 9/11 terror attacks, responders typically apply maximum 
effort toward moving to another domain, where more controlled approaches become 
applicable.  
The final, and dark, domain is disorder, where confusion reigns, and leaders do not 
recognize the ordered environment in which they are operating.50 Without strong, 
intentional leadership, disorder may overcome response efforts. Snowden and Boone 
characterize this state as follows: “Multiple perspectives jostle for prominence, factional 
leaders argue with one another, and cacophony rules.”51 Snowden details the Cynefin 
framework and discusses the application of its principles in a 2010 video produced through 
his company, Cognitive Edge.52 He emphasizes that this model is for sense-making, not 
categorizing, thus suggesting practitioners may move through the model from domain to 
domain as the situation or their understanding of it clarifies.  
D. RESPONSE IMPLEMENTATION 
Incident response is far more than theory and guidance. Public safety and 
emergency management leaders are responsible for implementing corrective actions 
associated with every possible hazard and threat, whether from an intelligent adversary or 
a natural disaster. The mechanism of implementation for an emergency response is 
                                                 
48 Snowden and Boone, 5. 
49 Snowden and Boone, 5. 
50 Snowden and Boone, 5.  
51 Snowden and Boone, 4.  
52 Cognitive Edge, “The Cynefin Framework,” July 11, 2010, YouTube, video, 8:37, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=N7oz366X0-8&t=436s. 
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organized people who carry out the strategies developed within the structure of the National 
Response Framework and NIMS. Whether they be a single resource—such as a patrolling 
police officer—or a small team—such as a public works crew, fire engine complement, or 
ambulance with driver and paramedic—people carry out the goals and strategies associated 
with disaster response. 
In the United States, citizens typically think of first response and public safety 
organizations as police departments, fire departments, and EMS agencies. However, many 
governmental and non-governmental entities participate in disaster reactions. Public works 
and utilities, public health, regulatory services, volunteers, and private-sector companies 
all answer the call for assistance during times of disaster. Within the National Response 
Framework, responders can be identified by classification within their scope and purpose 
as incident management teams (IMTs), and nationally designated by their type.53  
Type 5 teams are small, single-discipline teams with fundamental incident response 
obligations.54 Though not ordinarily thought of this way, police, fire, and EMS 
departments are, in fact, specialized IMTs. Their scope, assignments, training, and 
licensing define their activities when they work singularly, even when they encounter each 
other on the same call for service. For example, in a motor vehicle accident scenario, each 
responder has a defined role. The police officer investigates criminality associated with the 
accident and may direct traffic for scene safety. Fire department personnel perform rescue 
functions, extracting victims from the damaged vehicle, and typically provide first aid. 
EMS staff examine victims in greater detail, provide advanced care interventions, 
administer medications, and transport the injured to a hospital. The coordination for this 
type of incident is pre-determined, and each element knows its roles before the accident 
occurs.  
When scenarios advance and elevated cross-coordination is required, teams may 
form to address specific objectives. Type 4 teams are single- or multi-agency teams, formed 
                                                 
53 U.S. Fire Administration, USFA Type 3 Incident Management Team, Instructor Guide, version 1.0 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Fire Administration and Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013), 1.25. 
54 U.S. Fire Administration, 1.25.  
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for expanding incidents.55 An example might be an active-shooter scene where leadership 
develops a coordinated plan with defined goals and strategies. Type 4 is a general 
categorization, not associated with a pre-selected or designated crew membership, 
developed ad hoc at the time of disaster. Beyond Type 4, IMTs are requested to respond 
by local decision-makers, such as city managers or county officials, and receive authority 
to spend funds and command local resources.  
At the level of Type 3 IMTs, qualified, trained, and credentialed members form an 
on-call team available 24 hours per day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. The Incident 
Command System (ICS) defines the members of a Type 3 team, including command and 
general staff. Each member must have experience and training beyond one’s profession 
and obtain certification as ICS-qualified to hold each position in the IMT (see Figure 3).56 
Accreditation of each member’s qualifications, training, and experience is vetted at one’s 
level of service, whether a state or local team.  
                                                 
55 U.S. Fire Administration, 1.25.  
56 U.S. Fire Administration, 1.26.  
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Figure 3. Incident Command Structure57 
Beyond Type 3, at the regional and national level, teams are designated Type 2 or 
Type 1, respectively. Response efforts at all levels are carried out by the IMT. Incident 
planning and coordination take place within the foundational principles of ICS for each 
specific incident. While IMTs take command of a single incident, local authorities maintain 
responsibilities for all other local reactions, which may be necessary. When requested to 
respond, IMTs, regardless of type, are the instruments used to apply tactics, or the steps 
taken to mitigate a disaster, for all kinds of scenarios. Notably, the fundamental element of 
an IMT is that its most common use is as a deployable resource. People from outside 
entities form an IMT, before an incident, and then receive orders to provide aid to an 
affected jurisdiction at the time of a disaster. It is not routine to use an internal IMT only 
for an in-house response. What defines an IMT is the specific ICS training it receives for 
an express application during disaster response. When assembled as an IMT, members are 
no longer police officers, firefighters, medics, or other professions. They are incident 
commanders, section chiefs, unit leaders, and other ICS-specific responders who apply the 
principles of ICS as a coordinated team.  
                                                 
57 Source: “ICS Review – ICS Structure,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, accessed October 
31, 2020, https://emilms.fema.gov/IS2200/groups/19.html. 
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This chapter described some of the most relevant literature regarding four 
components of emergency preparedness and response. Federal policies, laws, grants, and 
systems influence response agencies by suggesting, and in some cases requiring, the 
development of all-hazards pre-incident plans. In addition, it presented two planning 
perspectives: assumption-based pre-incident strategies attempt to predict future events and 
propose response options, while adaptive principles introduce flexibility and customization 
for emergency response. Furthermore, complexity theory relies on an understanding of a 
crisis in real time whereas process-based problem-solving allows the practitioner to apply 
a system within a given domain—so leaders must know the difference between 
categorizing, analyzing, and experimenting to find solutions. Finally, this chapter defined 
the need for having a mechanism to implement the tactics chosen during a response. IMTs 
ultimately provide the structure for transitioning ICS theories to practical applications. The 
next chapter presents case studies for analyzing each of these components as they occurred 
during actual incidents.  
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III. CASE STUDIES 
In the aftermath of significant critical incidents, response agencies typically 
conduct after-action reviews (AARs) and develop corrective action plans (CAPs). The goal 
of these products is to archive the positive and negative aspects encountered in the response 
and provide a basis for improving capabilities. This chapter presents three separate 
incidents, of which one details responses for the same regional flood but from two distinct 
organizational perspectives. Each case study presents background information on the area 
affected, describes the incident as captured in the AAR/CAP, analyzes the response vis-à-
vis the literature review components, and summarizes the case. Each case examines the 
impact pre-incident planning had on the response, discusses the planning process used by 
each entity during its response, determines how complexity affected decision-making, and 
discusses response implementation.  
All case review materials were derived from publicly accessible information, either 
from the AAR/CAP for each incident or from a public information website for the 
jurisdiction. The first case presents the 2018 Colorado River flood, which affected central 
Texas, specifically the greater Austin area. This flood required two responses, one from 
the city/county EOC and one from the water utility, Austin Water.58 The next case covers 
the impacts of Tropical Storm Irene on the town of Westport, Connecticut, in 2011. The 
final case involves the 2013 flood of the South Platte River, in Evans, Colorado. For 
consistency in evaluation, all three cases analyze naturally occurring disasters, but from 
different geographical areas of the country. Moreover, each experience required extended 
operations, which involved significant response planning and resource management.  
A. COLORADO RIVER FLOOD: AUSTIN, TEXAS, 2018 
Austin is the state capital of Texas, with a daytime population exceeding one 
million people. The bustling city, with a small-town feel, is the home of Texas barbeque, 
live music, and the University of Texas. It has a rich history of planned events, including 
                                                 
58 This author served as the emergency management coordinator for Austin Water during the incident. 
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South by Southwest, Austin City Limits Live, and the Circuit of the Americas’ Formula 1 
motor race. The city and county work closely with private event groups to conduct these 
publicly attended festivals, utilizing the ICS and pre-event planning.  
The relevance of this case study is that it provides two response perspectives for 
comparison from the same critical incident. Both the combined city/county EOC and 
Austin Water, as separate organizations, responded to and produced AARs for the 2018 
flood. Following the completion of this incident, the city and county contracted with 
Hagerty Consulting to facilitate an AAR and produce an improvement plan and report.59 
Hagerty Consulting is an emergency management firm that aids its clients in preparation 
for and recovery from disasters.60 According to its website, it provides preparedness and 
recovery consulting, which includes the development of AARs. Austin Water developed 
its AAR internally through a series of work sessions with its employees.61  
Fall storms in Central Texas can be extremely challenging and have a devastating 
impact, with October being a particularly difficult month. Between October 2013 and 
October 2018, the greater Austin region experienced three 100-year flood events.62 The 
Colorado River flood of 2018 brought significant challenges to Austin. Flooding crested 
the banks of the river in Lake Austin, in Lady Bird Lake, and downstream of the Longhorn 
Dam, located in downtown Austin.63 Along with the flooding that prompted evacuations 
within Travis County, the river water became so inundated with dirt, silt, and debris that 
water treatment plants could not process raw water effectively. As a precautionary move 
                                                 
59 Austin Homeland Security and Emergency Management and Travis County Office of Emergency 
Management, Colorado River Flooding After Action Report (Austin, TX: Hagerty Consulting, 2019), 
https://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/HSEM/
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to avoid distributing unsafe drinking water, the utility ultimately issued a boil water notice 
(BWN), which directed all users of the public drinking-water system to boil water before 
consumption. At the time, the announced BWN was the largest in U.S. history, affecting 
more than one million residents over seven days. Overall, the incident resulted in 
activations of both the city/county EOC and Austin Water’s Department Operations Center 
(DOC).  
Beginning in mid-October of 2018, heavy rains fell in Llano, Texas, approximately 
60 miles to the north-northwest of Austin, overwhelming waterways and creating flood 
conditions for the entire Austin region. Over just two days—October 15 and 16—the area 
received 10 inches of rain in 48 hours.64 Reservoirs and lakes along the Lower Colorado 
River quickly began to experience flooding, from Llano to the Gulf of Mexico. This section 
of the river is referred to as the “Highland Lakes” area, snaking from Lake Buchanan 
through Austin and then downstream of the Longhorn dam. The city/county EOC directed 
evacuations within Travis County and led the process of distributing bottled water. Because 
of the BWN, city leaders decided to bring in bottled drinking water for use by those who 
were unable, or unwilling, to boil their water before consumption or use.  
1. City and County Response 
The City of Austin is the primary municipality within Travis County and, as such, 
operates the combined city/county EOC. The City of Austin’s Department of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management manages EOC operations, budget, and staffing. The 
Travis County Office of Emergency Management is a contributing stakeholder in the EOC, 
providing staff, funding, and coordination.  
The EOC routinely coordinates local pre-planned events, such as Formula 1 Racing, 
the South by Southwest music festival, the Austin City Limits music festival, and others. 
Because these events are scheduled and pre-planned, ABP has historically worked well to 
coordinate the required resources. Notably, ABP works because planners have experienced 
                                                 




these events in the past. Indeed, they can draw from their own experience and from the 
records of past events to develop current planning. Dates, time schedules, participation 
estimates, and resource needs are known before the event, simplifying the planning 
process. Conversely, the EOC has actively coordinated multiple past emergency incident 
responses, including floods, hurricanes, and wildfires, and have noted difficulties when 
attempting to rely on pre-existing plans.  
a. Federal Guidance 
As detailed in the literature review, the national incident management strategy 
asks—and in some cases requires—that response agencies operate under a coordinated, 
pre-incident, all-hazards emergency response plan (ERP). During the 2018 flood, the City 
of Austin’s Emergency Operations Plan was approved and in place.65 Travis County’s 
Basic Plan was also authorized and active, encompassing the unincorporated areas of 
Travis County and 17 villages or cities located within the county.66 The plans and related 
annexes provide the foundations for response based on the principles of NIMS and ICS to 
coordinate all city/county departments during critical incidents.67  
Both plans declare flooding in central Texas as a significant and common natural 
hazard, with minor differentiations between flash flooding and river flooding. Austin cites 
late spring and fall as prime flooding seasons.68 While both plans establish departmental 
and agency requirements for critical incident response for the many different city and 
county agencies, based on their routine or normal operational functions, neither contains 
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specific flood incident response procedures. Moreover, these basic plans provide no 
shaping actions as prescribed by ABP.  
Hagerty Consulting’s review of this response notes many strengths, most of which 
related to the working relationships existing between the EOC and its many stakeholders. 
Having an extensive array of participants, across many functional boundaries, provided the 
basis for the successes realized during this incident.69 However, despite the availability of 
both basic plans, Hagerty Consulting’s AAR cites many deficiencies made manifest during 
the incident. For example, the city and county experienced confusion with activation and 
notifications, as well as with coordination between the two emergency documents.70 
Though the plans direct these processes, it appears that at the time of the disaster, staff 
relied more on routine actions and relationships than on activating the procedures from 
either plan.71 
Though both plans provide coordinating guidance for different city and county 
departments, interagency coordination was a significant challenge as well. The AAR 
describes a lack of focus on inclusivity and organization with stakeholders.72 Responders 
from agencies with specific experience fared much better than those who had received 
assignments at the time of the disaster. Learning specific ICS roles with just-in-time 
training presented powerful obstacles, prompting a recommendation within the AAR to 
explore the formation of a combined city/county IMT and consolidate emergency plans.73 
Arguably, this recommendation—to establish an IMT—supports the central theory behind 
this thesis. 
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Though both basic plans exist as integration documents, many other department- 
and agency-level plans are also in place. Thus, shortcomings in coordinating all existing 
procedures, among all responders, were a noted fault.74 The size of the documents—at 160 
pages for Austin and 48 for Travis County—is likely a deterrent for their use during 
emergencies. Moreover, these large documents present more generalities than directions 
for a response. The AAR repeatedly emphasizes the need for training and exercising staff 
who will respond during actual emergencies. In sum, basic plans are impractical when 
teams are not proficient with them, when teams are not skilled enough to implement them, 
and when the documents are so large that their use is unlikely during the stresses associated 
with disaster response.  
b. Planning  
The city’s and county’s emergency operations plans are both pre-incident, 
assumption-based documents that should provide fundamental frameworks for incident 
response. The plans assume that during a disaster, the city and county will have sufficient 
resources to implement a particular intervention.75 However, these plans do not ensure that 
adequate resources are trained and in place. If the case arose that adequate resources were 
not available, both plans assume that regional, state, and federal partners would assist.76 
During this incident, the EOC activation and coordinated response lasted for 21 days.77 
The duration and limited resources proved to be some of the most significant challenges 
for response leaders. The toll on a relatively small cache of experienced and willing staff 
was heavy. Many served for the entire incident with little or no time off for rest and 
rehabilitation, while still responsible for their day-to-day duties. Together, the city and 
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county had approximately 12,000 employees who could have helped had they been trained 
and activated. This incident saw only a fraction of that number in the EOC.  
The assumption of coming aid is dangerous because it relies on the assistance of 
outside jurisdictions and fails to capitalize on the many city and county employees who 
could receive pre-incident training to staff activations internally. During a large incident, 
many jurisdictions might experience challenges that render them unable to spare resources. 
As with experiences noted during the COVID-19 pandemic, sometimes all jurisdictions are 
engaged and unable to send assistance. A widely held axiom of emergency management is 
that all disasters begin and end locally, yet the existing plans for Austin and Travis County 
do not ensure that local resources are sufficient.  
This case study exposes another concern with pre-incident planning. What happens 
when leaders are unaware of an existing plan? In this incident, a stakeholder agency had a 
pre-planned process for establishing and operating points of distribution (PODs). However, 
response leaders were not aware of those plans and engaged in adaptive planning to set 
objectives and define tactics.78 PODs allowed for distributing bottled water throughout the 
greater Austin area. Each site was set at a different location and presented specific issues, 
so leaders could adapt plans to each situation. Evaluating the effectiveness of the existing 
pre-incident POD plan in this case study is not an option, as it remained unused, on the 
shelf, during this response.  
An adaptive planning process was used extensively during this incident in EOC 
operations and for evacuation and distribution planning. Existing emergency plans did not 
provide the shaping-action guidance necessary for leaders to assign tactics to meet incident 
needs. Instead, decision-makers relied on the experiences of only a relatively few 
departmental staff, brought with them from working together in their routine capacity or 
past incidents and events. At times, this response lost the feeling of being an ICS incident. 
Feedback from participants includes the recommendation to increase the utilization of ICS, 
specifically the incident action plan (IAP), and the need for much more EOC training for 
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all who do respond.79 The ICS process receives more coverage in the response 
implementation section.  
c. Complexity and Decision-Making 
At the outset of this incident, leaders were likely operating in Snowden’s obvious 
domain.80 The AAR notes that the timing for activation to this incident was imprecise and 
that responding agencies were uncoordinated in their mobilization.81 The incident occurred 
at the tail end of a pre-planned event, a Formula 1 race at the Circuit of the Americas’ track 
in Austin.82 There was, presumably, an assumption that this incident would follow patterns 
experienced in the past. However, as stressors mounted, the operational domain 
transitioned from complicated to complex. Existing response planning did not account for 
the complexity, and response efficiency suffered as leaders struggled to find adequate 
staffing and meet the cadence of the flood.83  
Leaders failed to address this incident from a complexity perspective. The markers 
of operating in the obvious domain include the ability to use best practices for problem-
solving and a clear connection between cause and effect. Moreover, while heavy rains had 
caused the flooding, no best practice available could ensure an adequate response. 
Furthermore, pre-incident plans had not provided the commensurate shaping actions 
necessary for the conditions experienced in this flood.  
The two governing constraints for problem-solving in the complicated domain are 
time and expertise. Both limiting factors saw severe challenges during this incident. 
Continuous heavy rains did not afford responders the time to wait and see how conditions 
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might change, so evacuations were necessary to protect the lives of those impacted. As 
noted throughout the AAR, city and county responders lacked sufficient experience and 
expertise in addressing a flood of this magnitude. Because of the lack of time or knowledge 
to manage this flood, leaders should have defaulted to the complex domain. 
In the complex domain, leaders would have developed many small experiments, 
with pre-determined abilities to magnify or attenuate their actions based on feedback, to 
address specific challenges presented by the flood. An example from feedback reported in 
the AAR is an experiment with POD operations. The EOC selected seven sites for bottled 
water distribution, yet site staff received operations and set-up instructions from the EOC. 
To experiment, the EOC could have provided operating parameters and included the power 
to amplify or dampen processes based on the traffic it received.84 The ability to expand 
pick-up lanes, add security resources, or change processes at individual sites would reflect 
an adaptive, experimental probe-sense-respond method, as described by the Cynefin 
framework.  
d. Response Implementation 
As Hagerty Consulting’s AAR states, “Operating the EOC while maintaining day-
to-day operations of department/agencies and DOCs was challenging during this incident 
due to resource limitations.”85 Basic tenets of direction and control were problematic 
during this response. Indeed, the AAR points out that confusion evolved when leadership 
did not follow the basic principles of ICS.86 At times, multiple individuals believed they 
had command of defined response elements because of an uncoordinated incident 
command structure.87 Common ICS pillars, such as IAPs, standard response meetings and 
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briefings, and ICS forms, were insufficient to coordinate effectively.88 The AAR 
recommends adhering to the principles of ICS during emergency responses.89 Following 
these principles allows responders to plan adaptively. Ultimately, ICS is an adaptive 
process that constantly drives leaders and planners—through the planning “P”—to analyze 
and modify plans when conditions either improve or worsen. 
The many weaknesses discussed in the AAR include coordination of planning, 
operations, and communications. Recommendations repeatedly call for increased training 
and exercising of staff who have obligations to respond during critical incidents. Bringing 
a team together from multiple departments in an actual emergency without adequate 
training and experience creates issues that hamper the effectiveness of the response.90 
Numerous recommendations from the AAR stress the importance of training and exercises 
for any team that responds to disasters of this magnitude. Recommendation 1.18, under the 
response operations section, reads, “The City and County should explore the creation of a 
local IMT that is pre-trained for specific positions and can support meeting the needs of 
operational resource requirements.”91 
e. Summary 
The City of Austin and Travis County did have emergency operations plans in 
effect during this incident. However, the plans did not provide the shaping actions 
necessary for directing the response. Recall from the literature review that shaping actions 
are those options designed to produce a specific outcome. Responders in this case were 
insufficiently trained and inexperienced in implementing either plan during a severe flood. 
The adopted planning strategy did not include instructions for an adaptive process that 
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considered complications or complexity during emergencies. The NIMS strategy of 
developing pre-incident planning was ineffective for this response because responders 
lacked sufficient training on the plans, and leaders were unaware of incident-specific plans 
that were in place. A specifically designed operational POD plan for distributing bottled 
water remained on the shelf, rendering the document useless. 
The AAR produced by Hagerty Consulting identifies many strengths that 
contributed to the eventual resolution of the incident but defines considerably more 
recommendations for improvement. Some of the highlighted recommendations include 
clarifying the process to identify and reassign personnel into emergency operations, pre-
train and regularly exercise staff who respond during emergencies, use the ICS during 
disaster response, and align activation levels between city and county agencies. Primarily, 
though, Hagerty Consulting recommends establishing a pre-identified team trained and 
exercised to respond with enhanced response capabilities, and this thesis fully supports that 
proposition.92  
2. Austin Water Response 
Austin Water (AW) is the sole provider of treated potable water for the greater 
Austin region, serving approximately 1.5 million customers. The department has been in 
existence for more than 100 years, enduring many natural disasters and industrial accidents 
in its history, including flooding, extreme weather, industrial mechanical accidents, and 
hazardous chemical leaks. Following the devastating 2013 Halloween floods, the utility 
created the dedicated position of emergency management coordinator (EMC). Prior to 
introducing the EMC, each facility or functional program area within the utility was 
responsible for conducting site-specific emergency planning and response.  
In March 2016, I established an internal Type 4 IMT to coordinate all emergency 
responses. I did so because the size and scope of the organization covered some 15 different 
locations and workgroups throughout the greater Austin area. Each had its own ICS 
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structure with the expectation of coordinating its own response during critical incidents. 
By pulling all locations under a modified area command and establishing the IMT, AW 
was better able to coordinate response operations and limited resources. The team began 
small, selecting approximately 35 AW staff with enough operational experience and 
positional authority from within the utility. All members obtained certification in ICS 
training, up to at least the intermediate level, and together attended training on the conduct 
and operations of an IMT. Since its inception, the team has expanded to approximately 125 
members, routinely conducts training and tabletop exercises, and has responded to multiple 
incidents. The roster, in its current configuration, represents a little more than 10 percent 
of the total workforce for the utility, leaving significant resources to meet routine 
operational needs. Following the 2018 flooding incident, the AW’s EMC produced an 
independent utility AAR, attached to the City of Austin’s 2018 Colorado River flooding 
AAR.  
From the AW perspective, this rain incident represented a concern for the Dam 
Operations Division. AW had taken over the operation of the dam from another city utility 
just a year prior and was relatively inexperienced in dealing with flooding. This particular 
dam has provided power generation in the past, but at the time of the incident, it maintained 
lake levels in a downtown recreational lake. The structure uses hydraulic gates and 
weighted bascules to maintain the desired level on Lady Bird Lake. During times of 
flooding, operators staff the dam 24 hours per day across two 12-hour shifts.93 The utility 
monitors weather conditions continuously, so on October 16, it learned of the impending 
storm. Dam operations began their 12-hour rotations in preparation for responding to the 
floodwaters.  
About two days into the incident, one of AW’s three water treatment plants started 
noticing elevated turbidity in raw-water testing. Turbidity is a measure of relative clarity 
within a water sample and indicates the presence of particulate matter than can affect the 
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treatment process.94 Turbidity levels exceeded anything historically known—at least at 
AW—and were so obstructive to the treatment process that plants began experiencing 
automated shutdowns. Essentially, the incoming raw-water was so thick with mud, silt, and 
debris from the flooding river that plant production could not meet potable water demands. 
Engineers and plant operators worked day and night for a week to develop new processes 
and system workarounds. Utility leaders decided to invoke use restrictions and a 
precautionary BWN to reduce demands on the system.95 
a. Federal Guidance 
AW did not have an overarching emergency operations plan in place at the time of 
this incident. Coincidentally, in the same month of the flood, the federal government passed 
the America’s Water Infrastructure Act into law, requiring utility-wide ERPs. However, 
during the 2018 Colorado River flood, no such document existed. Facilities and work 
divisions within the utility did maintain some short issue-specific plans, such as localized 
chemical accident standard operating procedures (SOPs) and life-safety plans. Still, no 
plans existed to address excess turbidity in the raw river water. 
An internal SOP establishing the AW’s IMT was the precursor to having a response 
team in place. The SOP defines assignments and training requirements and details the inner 
workings of the group. All members must have ICS training, up to and including ICS 300, 
Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents. A few members have advanced and role-
specific training as well. Recommendations from the AAR include the expansion of the 
IMT to fulfill response obligations better, with particular attention to situational awareness 
and a situation unit within the planning section.96  
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AW uses a combination of pre-incident continuity-of-operations planning and real-
time IMT response planning through the ICS planning process.97 During an incident 
response, the incident commander (IC) establishes incident objectives for each operational 
period. The general staff then utilize the ICS planning process to develop strategies and 
tactics related to each objective and document those tactics in the IAP.98  
During this incident, I served as one of the DOC managers for the IMT. DOC 
manager is not a standard position within ICS but a specific local position within our IMT, 
providing direct assistance and advising the IC and members of the IMT. The information 
contained in this section is from the AAR and my recollections of the response. During the 
2018 Colorado River flood, the AW’s IMT generated IAPs for each of 17 consecutive 12-
hour operational periods.99 At the beginning of each operating period, the IC began the 
shift with a recap of the previous shift’s accomplishments and review of objectives. The 
entire team followed the ICS planning P to work through selecting tactics and developing 
the IAP for the next evolution. The planning P is an iterative schedule for the adaptive 
planning process within ICS.100  
AW did not have incident-specific plans for addressing extreme turbidity. To direct 
changes to the water treatment process, engineers and plant operators assigned within the 
Water Treatment Unit of the Operations Section adapted to the worsening conditions as 
they occurred. Without being tethered to a pre-incident plan, adaptation and flexibility were 
the keys to finding solutions. Each treatment plant operated with slightly different 
processes, so the team created separate process plans for each plant. The following section 
details the decision-making process.  
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c. Complexity and Decision-Making 
AW’s initial approach to this incident was to monitor weather alerts from the 
National Weather Service and other regional stakeholders. Though the region anticipated 
heavy rains, the utility was not concerned about its ability to treat source water. The 
primary concerns involved dam operations, a responsibility that had been recently acquired 
by the department, in January 2018.101  
No current staff at AW had ever experienced flooding and rains to the degree 
witnessed during this incident. This lack of familiarity presented barriers to understanding 
the troubles that lay ahead. Utility leaders and treatment operations managers could not 
have predicted that their systems would fail to treat the incoming river water—because of 
availability bias.102 Their treatment systems had never failed from regional flooding, so 
they could not imagine it happening then.  
Leaders began the incident by operating in the obvious domain. They relied on 
entrained thinking, attempting solutions that had worked in the past but were unproductive 
in this situation. No one in the utility was aware of the Cynefin framework during this 
incident, but without knowing it at the time, decision-makers transitioned into the complex 
operative domain. Managers had sufficient expertise to problem-solve in the complicated 
domain, but there was insufficient time to sense, analyze, and respond appropriately. 
Conditions within the plants deteriorated at such a pace that decision-makers had to 
experiment with optional response variances to find practical solutions.  
Eventually, leaders realized they were attempting to hold onto a production 
standard that the plant equipment could not meet. Imagine a runner trying to maintain a 
pre-defined pace on a flat track, for instance, an eight-minute mile. That pace is likely easy 
for many runners. Such a speed is the equivalent of the treatment process producing water 
at its daily rate. Now imagine maintaining that same pace but up a hill instead of on flat 
ground. The runner is working harder on the incline to maintain her speed. The turbid 
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water, like the incline, caused the treatment process to gas out. Filters were working so 
hard that the plants could not keep up and went into automatic shutdowns. Once leaders 
realized that the production standard—a measure of the quality of water discharged from 
the plants—was the limiting factor, they could experiment with adjustments and overcome 
the issue.  
Without understanding it at the time, the utility applied the principles of probing, 
sensing, and responding from Snowden’s complexity domain.103 AW isolated factors until 
it found the one that, with adjustments, would allow for sustained production. By 
recognizing the performance standard as the limiting factor, AW adapted to the turbidity 
and sustained production without jeopardizing public health. 
d. Response Implementation 
To address the risks associated with this substantial rainfall incident, AW activated 
its internal DOC and IMT.104 The team assembled on Sunday morning, October 21, 2018, 
and worked in 12-hour segments of time, called operational periods. Members 
implemented the ICS planning P, a set of scheduled meetings and development deadlines, 
to produce IAPs for subsequent shifts. The IAPs guided team members who worked during 
a given operational period.105  
Activating the DOC and IMT allowed AW to plan in real time for the circumstances 
it experienced during this incident. Members of the Resource Unit, within the Planning 
Section, monitored multiple relevant conditions, including weather, source water quality, 
treatment plant operations, discharge water quality, potable water supplies, pumping 
services, and flood impacts at utility facilities, as they occurred. Operations Section 
personnel then interpreted those conditions and developed response tactics to address 
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shortfalls. Other general staff within the Logistics Section, Finance Section, and Planning 
Section then provided operational support to carry out the chosen tactics.  
The command and general staff worked in the DOC, located in the administrative 
headquarters building of the utility, while Operations units worked at the three water 
treatment plants. Operations status meetings, planning meetings, and briefings occurred on 
internet-based video conferences. Those with a need to know or be involved with the 
planning could join remotely, which enhanced the ability to share information and build 
situational awareness over a large geographical area, in real time.  
The IMT was critical, as the mechanism of implementation, for carrying out the 
plans developed to meet strategic objectives. It was the adaptability, of an ICS-trained 
team, that allowed AW to evaluate conditions that personnel had not experienced before 
and design practical experiments to address the novel conditions.  
Following this incident, an internal AAR detailed the strengths and weaknesses of 
the team’s response.106 The IMT was a critical factor in the utility’s ability to maintain 
potable water production for drinking and fire suppression throughout the entire incident. 
Though the department had not experienced an emergency of this magnitude before, the 
team provided real-time planning and support to maintain services to the community.107  
e. Summary 
AW did not have a pre-incident ERP, yet the utility fielded an IMT to address the 
situation. The pre-selected, pre-trained, and experienced team provided the basis for a 
response that permitted adaptive reactions to conditions in real time. Even without a 
guiding document, the team implemented its training in the ICS and developed effective 
response protocols. The IMT allowed AW to be flexible in its response and adapt to the 
situation as it was happening. That flexibility empowered team members to shift between 
Cynefin domains, regardless of whether the team knew what it was doing. Effectively, 
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planning in real time induces shifts between the different approaches to problem-solving 
that Cynefin details. The fact that the team was not adhering to a doctrinal policy was likely 
the reason it could experiment with different solutions. Experimentation, patience, and 
team interaction led to transitions from the obvious through the complicated and complex 
domains.108 
B. TROPICAL STORM IRENE: WESTPORT, CONNECTICUT, 2011 
In late August 2011, Westport, Connecticut, readied for an incoming storm. 
Westport is a small coastal town, just north of New York City, on Long Island Sound, and 
August is peak hurricane season. Westport officials had been tracking an incoming storm 
for a week, preparing for landfall in their backyard.109 They anticipated that this storm 
would be one of the most destructive in decades.110 The City of Westport has a long history 
of dealing with incidents from bouts with inclement weather.111 Within the previous 24 
months, local authorities had responded to multiple weather issues, including a severe 
flooding incident, a tornado in nearby Bridgeport, an extreme wind issue, and a January 
snow emergency.112  
Following the passing of Tropical Storm Irene, the director of emergency 
management for the City of Westport produced an AAR. This report highlights details of 
the lead-up, response to, and recovery from this weather incident.113 The report and 
information found on the City of Westport’s website were the resources used to construct 
this case study.  
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1. Federal Guidance 
Neither the AAR for this case study nor the Westport city website mentions having 
an all-hazards city-wide ERP in place. The city website does list an emergency 
preparedness guide, which provides basic information for residents, and presents terms, 
suggested equipment, and general instructions.114 It does not meet the standard of an ERP, 
as it is not scenario-based, does not include risk assessment language or information, and 
does not direct response actions for specific threats or emergency conditions.  
2. Planning 
The AAR for this incident describes planning conducted in expectation of the 
storm. Planning was not assumption-based, as would be the case with an all-hazards ERP, 
but was instead consistent with the adaptive approach, conducted in anticipation of an 
actual and specific threat. Local authorities monitored the storm as it advanced and began 
taking precautionary actions before the storm reached them. Modern weather tracking radar 
and modeling from the National Weather Service provided up-to-the-minute information 
on the path and severity of the storm.115  
Public safety and emergency response planners did not reference an on-the-shelf 
plan but relied on their combined experiences to develop preparatory actions as Irene 
became imminent.116 Authorities made decisions based on their past experiences with 
storms such as the one that was approaching. They anticipated flooding that would restrict 
their ability to respond but did not know precisely where flooding would occur. They pre-
staged shelter locations for displaced residents, activated Community Emergency 
Response Team members and volunteers to staff their facilities, and made many other 
preparations. 
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However, one significant lesson learned was that they had to remain flexible during 
the actual response. “Our best plans had to be modified at the last moment due to storm 
acceleration,” wrote the director.117 As on-scene conditions changed, leaders and 
responders adapted to address new challenges. Attempting to stick to pre-incident planning, 
as circumstances vary, would most likely have degraded the effectiveness of their response. 
3. Complexity and Decision-Making 
Days before this storm reached Westport, authorities were evaluating the potential 
dangers and pre-staging resources for a response. Decision-makers attempted to understand 
the rising threat and applied their experience and expertise to this circumstance. The AAR 
does not reflect an attitude of complacency or of underestimating the challenges that they 
faced. Instead, decision-makers appear to have been operating within the complicated 
domain, as defined by Cynefin.118 Authorities contemplated many factors as they 
developed their response approach, such as tidal implications, soil saturation from previous 
rain, the sheer size of the storm that was approaching, and the population density of their 
region.119 All of these factors together led leaders to the response choices they made. 
While there is no mention of Cynefin as a guiding framework in this AAR, those crafting 
this response were seemingly acting within that decisional domain.  
4. Response Implementation 
This report does not directly identify an IMT for this episode; however, the 
responders acted as one. The AAR details regularly scheduled situational update meetings 
between command staff and liaisons from local utilities and regional critical infrastructure 
organizations.120 Response groups—from financial tracking to public information—and 
damage assessment teams are detailed in the report. Financial monitoring was aided by 
assigning unique account numbers for expenditures associated with the response. Another 
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noted efficiency was in establishing a secondary command division to improve the span of 
control and account for the possibility of isolation from flooding.121 All of these 
operational constructs are indicative of Westport’s use of the IMT concept.  
Suggested improvements from the AAR include using ICS documents and 
developing an IAP for every operational period.122 An IAP is a specific documentary tool 
utilized by IMTs—and detailed in the instructions provided during IMT training—in the 
ICS planning process.123 Another observation notes that adding a resource unit, a 
specialized component of the IMT Planning Section, would improve accountability for all 
resources during a response.124 Again, these notes indicate the use of an IMT-like 
structured intervention.  
5. Summary 
Westport did not have an assumptive plan directing its response actions for Irene in 
2011. It did have a group of experienced professional and volunteer responders who made 
just-in-time decisions as a significant storm approached. Though not referenced as an IMT 
in its AAR, the command structures and adaptive planning framework utilized for this 
storm are consistent with the principles of an IMT and the techniques associated with 
adaptive planning.  
Decision-makers monitored the storm as it advanced and staged resources to meet 
the challenges they anticipated. However, they did not fall back on assumptions or become 
complacent as they analyzed the threat. The command structure did not fall into making 
habitual decisions; instead, it maintained flexibility by relying on analysis and evaluation 
of the efficacy of its choices. This build-measure-learn approach is consistent with the 
adaptive processes explained by lean theory.125  
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C. EVANS FLOOD: EVANS, COLORADO, 2013 
In mid-September of 2013, the small city of Evans, Colorado, experienced a 
devastating storm and flood incident, which caused an estimated $17 million in 
damages.126 Damage to infrastructure and housing included more than 200 mobile homes, 
56 single-family homes, numerous commercial buildings, the city wastewater treatment 
facility, and nearly 1.5 miles of roadway.127 More than 1,000 residents evacuated with 
their families for over 48 hours, and approximately 70 percent of the city was without sewer 
services for more than a week.128 
The response to this incident involved some 64 separate entities from government, 
non-government, and private-sector stakeholders, including mutual aid from neighboring 
cities, Weld County, and the State of Colorado. Two days into their response, leaders 
deemed city resources insufficient to manage this crisis, and the South West Colorado IMT 
responded to provide aid.129 Following the flood, the city commissioned an AAR, 
published in February 2015, which details the disaster and the associated response.  
1. Federal Guidance 
The AAR does not mention Evans’ having an all-hazards ERP, nor does the city’s 
website have an ERP posted for public review. The report states that the city did not have 
a “disaster recovery plan” at the time of the flood and recommends creating one. Several 
existing plans—including a continuity-of-operations plan last updated in 2009, flood 
mitigation, a utility emergency action plan, and a city master plan—needed to be 
revamped.130 The city’s Office of Emergency Management website does provide 
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emergency preparedness information and links to several resources for citizen 
awareness.131 
2. Planning 
Response leaders did not rely on an existing ERP to address this flood. Heavy rains 
in the days leading up to this emergency raised concern; however, officials could not have 
predicted the berm failure that resulted in citywide flooding on September 13, 2013. 
Drawing from past experiences with floods and making plans as rains continued, on the 
evening of September 12, leaders issued voluntary evacuation notices to many 
residents.132 The river berm failed the next day, and by September 14, floodwaters on the 
South Platte River crested to a historic 18.7 feet, almost 9 feet above flood-stage elevation 
for the city of Evans.133  
Evans is a small city with minimal resources, so a state-sponsored IMT provided 
response command-and-control assistance on September 15, following a mutual aid 
request.134 The AAR does not detail the planning process of the IMT; however, the team 
that responded was state-certified as a Type 3 all-hazards team.135 Type 3 team members 
must have documented training and experience in applying the ICS, following the guidance 
presented in the Interstate Incident Management Team Qualifications System Guide.136  
Type 3 all-hazards team members meet qualification and training guidance to 
deploy during significant incidents that extend into multiple operational periods and use an 
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IAP to manage a response.137 IAPs are neither pre-incident nor assumption-based 
documents. Team members, primarily in the Planning Section, create IAPs to document 
incident objectives for the operational period following their current shift. Developing an 
IAP follows the adaptive model, as planners monitor circumstances in real time and 
establish tactics to meet defined strategies and objectives.138 
3. Complexity and Decision-Making 
According to the AAR, “Due to the complexity of the incident, crews expressed 
that some staff members were placed into positions they were unqualified for.”139 The 
local authorities struggled with the management of an incident of this size and scope. The 
AAR reports that Evans had very few staff with enough experience to match the storm and 
flooding they encountered. In fact, decision-making was the most challenging trial of the 
incident.140 
The report indicates that initial response actions were likely taking place in the 
obvious domain. While some best practices such as voluntary evacuations, resource 
staging, and others were occurring, the largely unseasoned leaders struggled to address 
challenges in real time. The AAR notes that the most recent flood before 2013 had occurred 
16 years earlier, so as complications set in, responders could not draw upon proficiency.  
The complicated domain connects an apparent relationship between problem and 
solution. To get to an appropriate answer, leaders sense, analyze, and respond.141 The two 
constraining factors for decision-making in complication are competence and time. Evans 
did not have the luxury of time to evaluate solutions, so it called in more aptitude by 
requesting the state IMT. As the incident progressed through complication to complexity, 
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Evans brought in a resource with enough training and skill to manage in the complicated 
domain.  
4. Response Implementation 
Local authorities organized themselves, with limited resources, to address the 
heavy rains and potential for flooding. However, because of their inexperience, they had 
difficulty in identifying threats and determining response needs.142 Within 24 hours of the 
berm’s failure that flooded much of their city, leaders realized they needed assistance with 
managing the response. On Sunday, September 15, 2013, the South West Colorado Type 
3 IMT assumed command, as authorized by the City of Evans, the Evans Fire Protection 
District, and the State of Colorado.143 For eight days, the IMT coordinated response 
activities, including repairing the compromised berm, allowing residents to return, and 
beginning the recovery process.  
Among the many benefits of having an experienced IMT in command, one 
particular advantage was that local responders could shadow and work with the team to 
gain hands-on experience. Training and exercises do aid responders, but the opportunity to 
work with and observe a trained IMT is invaluable. The local responders then understood 
the rhythm of an operational period, participated in planning meetings and briefings in real 
time, and developed actual IAPs.  
A primary recommendation from the AAR is that the City of Evans create a local 
incident response team, emphasizing ICS training and structure. The AAR reports that local 
leaders were confused at the outset of this incident and that the lack of ICS structure was a 
significant contributing factor.144 It further suggests that city leaders identify key 
participants to assume roles within the IMT structure and obtain the appropriate training 
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for each position.145 Many outlets offer such FEMA training—from introductory online 
courses to instructor-led intermediate, advanced, and position-specific classes.  
5. Summary 
The City of Evans did not have an ERP in place during the September 2013 flood 
that befell it. The continuity plan was outdated, and other smaller plans were not current. 
Adding to the issues faced during this flood, local responders and leaders were relatively 
inexperienced in managing natural disasters and critical incidents of this magnitude. 
However, they did monitor the incoming threat and did the best they could to get residents 
out of harm’s way.  
Nevertheless, local leaders did recognize the need to petition outside resources to 
assist them with their response. Requesting an IMT and authorizing it to take command 
provided the means with which the city met the challenges it faced. An IMT, with trained 
and experienced incident command staff, applied the principles of ICS to set objectives, 
determine strategies, and select tactics to respond to the residents’ needs successfully. 
Though the AAR recommends updating existing plans, the primary focus should be to 
develop a local team of pre-selected and trained responders.  
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IV. ANALYSIS: ENHANCING ASSUMPTIVE PLANNING FOR 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
In their 2009 book Managing Crises, authors Arnold Howitt and Herman Leonard 
present a binary theory of reaction for entities with emergency response obligations, routine 
emergencies, or crisis emergencies.146 The concept states that public safety and emergency 
management agencies build capabilities for response to condition and apply management 
principles as incidents arise.147 Howitt and Leonard also discuss a bottom-up process for 
disaster management; known commonly in the emergency management field with the 
axiom “All emergencies begin and end locally.”148 That concept is widely regarded, as 
true in emergency management, and taught in instructor-led ICS classes.  
Bottom-up means that local authorities have the responsibility of addressing issues 
that occur locally. It is the local police, fire, and EMS agencies, referred to typically as first 
responders, tasked with assisting the people who live in or visit their locales. Other 
agencies and departments also share in the process, such as public health departments, 
animal control, critical infrastructure, and private stakeholders.  
By routine, Howitt and Leonard describe the process whereby training coupled with 
repeated experience prepares responders to formulate solutions to problems as they arise. 
With sufficient experience, commonly repeated situations become normalized, and solving 
them becomes a habit. There is danger in this practice, though, as experienced responders 
may overlook indicators that show a given circumstance is not as it appears. When 
responders act routinely, they are operating in Snowden’s obvious domain.149 Some may 
believe, even convince themselves, that the situation they are dealing with is routine and, 
in doing so, miss essential signals alerting them to the criticality of the incident. Even when 
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events are repetitious, such as motor vehicle accidents, house fires, or complaints of chest 
pain, responders should avoid treating them as routine.  
Crisis emergencies, according to Howitt and Leonard, are those instances where 
conditions present novelty.150 Responders do not experience these types of incidents with 
regularity, or a common occurrence may become novel due to its size, scope, or other 
external factors. In these types of incidents, novelty can call into question preconceived 
templates for a response and may discredit pre-existing assumption-based plans. How, 
then, do response entities address crisis emergencies? 
Snowden’s Cynefin framework coupled with a qualified IMT provides the basis for 
improving emergency response outcomes. The IMT becomes the mechanism for 
implementing solutions, and the Cynefin framework guides operational perspectives and 
the problem-solving philosophy. Cynefin recommends that professional responders avoid 
the obvious domain unless they regularly review conditions and their solutions are 
apparent.  
A. APPLICATION OF THE CYNEFIN FRAMEWORK 
This chapter details the domains associated with Cynefin and discusses its 
application in disaster response. Snowden has provided direction for applying the Cynefin 
framework in his many articles and speeches. In a 2003 IBM Systems Journal article, he 
and co-author C. F. Kurtz describe in great detail Cynefin and its applications within 
knowledge management, strategy, management training, policy-making, and 
leadership.151 One tool I use frequently and share with others is an eight-minute video on 
YouTube in which Snowden describes the process of using Cynefin for dynamic problem 
solving.152 The video provides a ready resource that practitioners can review as they learn 
and apply the concepts of Cynefin.  
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When dealing with complications and complexity, responders must be aware of the 
conceptual space in which they operate. They must understand that the situations presented 
are generally not routine at all. Snowden suggests that responders limit work within the 
obvious domain to avoid misidentifying complicated or complex issues as routine. The 
obvious domain dictates fixed constraints with predictable, repeatable patterns and a clear 
nexus of cause and effect, which suggest a best-practice approach.153 The process here is 
to sense, categorize, and respond.154 Upon recognizing a situation, the responder observes 
relevant conditions and categorizes them relative to one’s past experiences. Imagine a 
mother walking into a room and seeing that her child has spilled milk on the table. This 
situation does not appear to be a new emergency, the toddler has spilled milk before, and 
mom knows the solution. She grabs paper towels and quickly cleans up the spill. However, 
does that best practice work best when the disaster is not milk? What if the problem is a 
caustic or poisonous substance? What if mom should not touch it all? Best practices could 
endanger responders and antagonize the situation if they are applied when inappropriate 
for the job.  
Another factor for consideration when operating in the obvious domain is the 
complacency cliff. When responders believe they have seen all of the variables in repeated 
situations or become too comfortable with innately dangerous circumstances, they become 
complacent and oblivious to worsening conditions. Complacency can rapidly shift events 
from obvious to chaotic in the blink of an eye. When responders lose sight of changing 
dynamics, rapid shifts into chaos alter their ability to react. The problem-solving process 
becomes act-sense-respond.155 An immediate response must take place to bring 
circumstances back under control. Chaotic responses do not offer guaranteed outcomes and 
are very hard on resources. How, though, should responders act as complications arise?  
Increasing the gap between cause and effect moves the situation into the 
complicated domain. Characterization within this environment is a known solution—but 
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unknown to the practitioner—and suggests that analysis instead of categorization is the 
better approach to problem-solving. In the complicated domain, Snowden describes the 
process as sensing, analyzing, and responding, and defines time and expertise as two 
governing constraints that guide the response.156 The restrictions are one of two dynamics 
involved in solving the new issue effectively. Responders must bring either specific 
expertise or time in which to analyze the situation more deeply.157 These two factors are 
the defining characteristics of the complicated domain because a relationship exists 
between cause and effect; however, it is not immediately self-evident.158 Responders 
operating in this domain utilize good practices to solve problems, as applying best practices 
here could have adverse effects.159 Good practices allow for variables to solutions, giving 
responders more choice in specific tactics. Following a template or script is contraindicated 
and can be disruptive to the response.160  
Complexity has a causal relationship, but only hindsight can provide its 
understanding. Outcomes are unpredictable, and solutions are novel and emergent.161 The 
process for solving complex issues is to probe, sense, and respond.162 Here, responders 
experiment with safe-to-fail options, having the ability to dampen or amplify inputs based 
on observed results.163 Moreover, Snowden points out that responders should not enact 
experiments until they have clearly defined dampening and amplifying procedures.164 
Ultimately, there is an increased likelihood of a synergistic effect, in which experiments 
can push critical conditions into more considerably distress.  
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Together, Cynefin’s complicated and complex domains represent the space in 
which emergency responders should most frequently consider solutions. In theory, these 
two domains provide the best opportunity for positive outcomes with the least risk of 
falling into chaos. Resources move between the complicated and complex realms 
reasonably quickly, and responders remain alert for changing conditions and can either 
apply expertise or experiment for positive results. Resources in the obvious domain, 
however, tend to be at rest and can require significant effort to engage.  
B. MECHANISM OF IMPLEMENTATION 
If Cynefin offers the framework for making sense of dynamic situations, how do 
responders implement solutions in real time? In my professional opinion, the preferred 
mechanism of implementation during critical incident response is the IMT. Over the past 
50 years, ICS has become the guiding principle behind emergency responses.165 As 
discussed previously, federal laws and policies dictate the use of ICS for agencies with 
response obligations and as a requirement for federal disaster fund reimbursements.  
ICS provides a standardized adaptive process for responding, ensures a universal 
understanding of terms and procedures, utilizes specific forms for documentation, assists 
with coordinating resources, and applies in every response and every state in the country. 
However, ICS is just a system, not a functional body. Effectively using ICS requires having 
a mechanism of implementation. The training required for an IMT is specific ICS training, 
and not the expertise that any single member brings from one’s regular profession. The 
experience necessary for a robust adaptive response is the understanding of the application 
of ICS principles in response to any category of disaster. I believe that local IMTs are not 
used prevalently because the application of ICS is a perishable skill and requires repeated 
training and exercises to maintain proficiency. Dedicating staff time for training and 
practices is a costly, time-consuming proposition and requires a great deal of participation 
from contributing organizations.  
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Nationally, the United States uses IMTs to affect the processes and procedures of 
ICS. There are five categories of IMTs, from small local Type 5 teams to large nationally 
accredited Type 1 structures.166 Credentialed and qualified members fill team command 
and general staff positions. The IC, liaison officer, public information officer, and safety 
officer all make up the command staff.167 The general staff positions are typically the four 
section chiefs, from Operations, Logistics, Planning, and Finance/Administration.168 
Teams can expand or contract based on the needs present at any given incident, giving 
them a great deal of flexibility when responding to a wide range of scenarios. 
C. INTEGRATING CYNEFIN AND INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 
When activated, two key IMT staff—typically the IC and the Operations Section 
chief—would use Cynefin to effect an optimal response. ICs lead the process of integration 
by identifying the conceptual domain in which the team operates and understanding which 
decision model to employ. ICs must be able to detach from the direct action and interpret 
conditions to know whether the incident is of the obvious, complicated, complex, or chaotic 
variety. By recognizing the appropriate domain, the IC then directs IMT staff to operate 
within it. 
The IC develops practical incident objectives, which communicate desired 
outcomes with the rest of the IMT. Using the acronym SMART—specific, measurable, 
action-oriented, realistic, and timely—to establish objectives, ICs guide response activities, 
directing actions associated with each domain. This style of planning ensures an adaptive 
approach, as objectives, strategies, and tactics are continuously evaluated and updated with 
changing conditions. The ICS planning P is the iterative structure that ensures the adaptive 
technique is in use. For example, should the IC define the incident as complex, he or she 
can request safe-to-fail experimentation strategies from the Operations and Planning teams. 
The distinction between the two planning styles—assumption-based and adaptive—is 
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made manifest here as ABP provides pre-identified options based on past experiences 
while the adaptive planning P ensures flexibility in an iterative planning cycle. 
The operations section chief (OSC) develops strategies and tactics from established 
objectives. Strategies are the various paths a team can take to meet objectives, and 
generally, OSCs look for multiple approaches that could work in a given situation. Tactics 
are the actual steps taken after choosing a particular strategy, and they translate into 
operational instructions for field-level crews addressing the emergency conditions.  
In a complicated scenario, both the IC and OSC should understand the decision 
model sequence of sense-analyze-respond, as provided in Cynefin. With that perspective, 
they either bring specific expertise to address the issue or provide time for their team to 
analyze the situation for a resolution. The Cynefin framework provides the basis for 
adaptive planning during emergency response instead of reliance on pre-incident 
assumption-based plans. Cynefin, or a similar approach to integrate complexity theory into 
problem-solving, would enhance a leader’s ability to respond to emergencies effectively.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis sought to examine whether a potential change in the national incident 
management strategy could improve emergency preparedness and test the hypothesis that 
a standard mechanism for implementation could improve critical incident response. A 
literature review of federal guidance and research in emergency management theory 
provided background and direction for the current policy of suggesting pre-incident, 
assumption-based, all-hazards planning as the standard national approach.  
The case studies reviewed indicate that assumption-based plans had little effect on 
the outcomes of each situation though, in each case, a team of responders was required to 
manage impacts and find solutions. In the City of Austin’s case, the Emergency Operations 
Plan provided no response direction, and the one pre-existing plan, for POD operations, 
remained unused. For AW and the City of Evans, an IMT provided direct response 
coordination and managed overall response operations. For the City of Westport, 
responders acted as an ad hoc IMT.  
At AW, the IMT was the critical element that allowed the utility to work through a 
problem it had never experienced. Members of the team brought personal and professional 
knowledge and capabilities to the problem. Still, it was their collective ability to apply the 
ICS process that allowed for the experimentation that led to a successful resolution.  
The cases reviewed do not, however, refute all value attributed to pre-incident 
planning. Jurisdictions should conduct ABP to understand the potential risks associated 
with their locations and services. All-hazards pre-incident plans aid in developing response 
capabilities and should be used for training and exercising coordinated response teams. 
Teams can use scenario-based procedures as learning tools to exercise responses within a 
simulated disaster.  
A change in the national strategy, from a focus on ABP to the development of local 
IMTs, would provide a mechanism for agencies and jurisdictions to respond. Local 
response teams that train and exercise together would provide the foundation for improved 
response efforts. The goal is not to eliminate assumption-based plans but to synthesize 
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them with established local response teams—preferably, teams that have an understanding 
of complex problem-solving, as presented in the Cynefin framework.  
In hindsight, the 2018 Colorado River flood is an example of a scenario that began 
as complicated but transitioned to complex as impacts of the flood progressed. Never 
having seen this particular problem, AW engineers developed experimental processes to 
address the turbidity issue that overwhelmed their treatment plants. The conversion took 
place as the engineers decided to attempt multiple solutions for the problem, using the 
probe-sense-respond framework.169 Though AW did not know it was working within the 
Cynefin model, it indeed followed the protocols developed by Snowden. It was the IMT 
that provided the mechanism for the utility to address the emergency conditions it faced. 
Adopting Cynefin as an analytical tool could aid decision-makers during critical incident 
responses.  
Because IMTs are pre-selected, trained, and exercised before emergency incidents, 
they represent possibly the most effective way for jurisdictions to prepare. I want to 
emphasize here that the following recommendations are not the easiest way to prepare for 
disasters. In my opinion, they are the best way to strengthen state and local responders. 
Assumption-based plans cannot possibly account for every variable within any given 
disaster. They offer more value as training tools for response teams. Organizations with the 
obligation to respond during disasters should continue to develop pre-incident plans and 
use them as tools to train and exercise responders before events unfold as emergencies.  
IMTs that learn and apply the Cynefin framework as a decision-making model 
transition from being reactionary to adaptive. Together, the team and the adaptive practice 
should significantly enhance any jurisdiction’s capacity to respond to emergencies. The 
cases reviewed in this thesis show that a shift in the national approach, by emphasizing 
teams utilizing an adaptive process, would assist local authorities in their response 
obligations. As shown in Table 2, ICs must recognize the appropriate domain in which to 
problem-solve. Understanding transitional indications, appropriate strategies, warning 
signs, and Cynefin concepts can help leaders manage effectively. 
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Table 2. Application of Cynefin for Crisis Response 






• Clear relationship 
between cause and effect  
• Repeatable  
• Evidence-based 
operations 
• Rapid transition to 
chaos 





• Use SOPs or 
standard operating 
guidelines 
• Delegate to 
subordinates 
• Routine monitoring 
practices suffice 
• Complacency  
• Routine thinking 









• Answers exist but must 
be researched or 
analyzed 
• More than one right 
answer  
• Discoverable but not 
obvious cause/effect 
relationship 
• Expert solutions 
produce unexpected 
outcomes 
• Situation improves 
(shift to obvious) or 




• Consult with experts 
• Embrace conflicting 
theories/options 
• Reliance on past 
solutions 
• Shutting out 
differing opinions 







• Volatility and 
uncertainty 
• Lack of patterns or 
replication 
• Competing ideas 
• Unknown cause/effect 
relationship 
• Emerging patterns 
(improving 
conditions) 





















• Conflict and high stress 
• Unknown answers 
• No time for analysis 
• Significant loss of 
property/life 
• Discovering links to 
cause/effect 
• Reduction in losses 
and stress 
• Emerging answers 
• Act-sense-respond 
• Apply all available 
resources  
• Seek assistance 
• Communicate and 
act 
• Belief in a single 
leader more than 
process 
• Failure to empower 
responders 
• Progressive losses 
 
Some influences may assist or detract from a jurisdiction’s move to initiate local 
IMTs. It would be beneficial to secure political backing from local elected officials and 
senior leadership within organizations before attempting to build these teams, as training 
and practice demand resources, funding, and time away from assigned duties to complete. 
Moreover, proficiency in the application of ICS is a perishable skill that can fade over time, 
and it is not unusual for individuals to take instructive courses in ICS and then not use those 
skills for months or even years. The ICS process requires dedication from leaders for 
participants to maintain their skills.  
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ICS is very formulaic in its practice and is rife with forms. Personnel must 
understand how and when to use them, as failure to use documents, structures, and 
hierarchies properly can lead to confusion and deficiencies, as noted in Hagerty 
Consulting’s AAR. However, when practitioners adhere to the process and the standardized 
structures are used effectively, the process allows for adaptive planning in real time.  
This study recommends several actions to improve local, state, and federal 
preparedness for crisis response. Each proposal stems from a review of current literature 
as analyzed within the context of the four selected case studies. The following 
recommendations correspond with each variable analyzed. 
A. FEDERAL GUIDANCE 
Through NIMS, DHS and FEMA should, in accordance with homeland security 
presidential directives, presidential policy directives, emergency management performance 
grants, and ICS, 1) continue to encourage local, state, and federal response agencies in the 
development of all-hazards ERPs and 2) require the establishment of IMTs by all 
jurisdictions or agencies seeking grant funding or disaster reimbursement. IMTs provide 
the mechanism by which response agencies coordinate collaborative response efforts, and 
through selection, training, and planning. 
B. PLANNING 
ABP provides value for local, state, and federal response agencies in identifying 
risks to operational continuity and as a tool for the training and exercise of crisis 
responders—and should continue for those purposes. This thesis recommends shifting to 
an adaptive process during actual response efforts. Active adaptive planning, executed in 
concert with the ICS planning P, and an understanding of complexity decision-making 
fundamentals provide strategic and tactical flexibility as operational conditions change.  
C. COMPLEXITY DECISION-MAKING 
This thesis recommends that critical response leaders obtain training in the 
application of the Cynefin framework to understand the theory of operations within each 
conditional constraint and develop problem-solving skills within each domain. Critical 
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skills include the ability to transition from chaotic conditions to an ordered status and avoid 
an uncontrolled decline from complacency into chaos.  
D. RESPONSE IMPLEMENTATION 
An IMT comprising pre-trained, experienced responders provides the mechanism 
with which jurisdictions and organizations can respond to critical incidents. Teams, 
through the use of task books, can track and measure each member’s training and 
experience to gauge a given entity’s capacity to respond during disasters and plan 
improvements as needed. Teams can utilize the four primary domains, as defined by the 
Cynefin framework, to design response processes. 
(1) Obvious Domain: Develop and use SOPs, standard operating guidelines, 
all-hazards ERPs, and incident-specific plans.  
(2) Complicated Domain: Develop and identify subject-matter experts within, 
or available, to provide conditional analysis during critical incident 
response. 
(3) Complex Domain: Provide key team leaders, such as ICs and section 
chiefs, with training in the application of the Cynefin framework, with an 
emphasis on applying the fixed, governing, or enabling constraints 
associated with each operational domain, as previously described. 
(4) Chaotic Domain: Engage all available resources to transition from chaos 
into the complex or complicated domain for management of the response.  
Type 4 teams, representing single agencies, should be built to handle expanding 
departmental incidents. Type 3 teams would be appropriate at the county or municipal 
level, capable of responding during developing events for extended operational periods. 
All required training materials are readily available to begin creating these teams. FEMA 
and the U.S. Fire Administration currently offer all-hazards IMT training in their O-305 
course. 
Practitioners or leaders who want to establish local IMTs can follow the process 
created at AW. It developed an IMT by identifying the minimally viable product needed to 
coordinate utility-wide responses and selected existing staff required to form the core team. 
AW wanted to have the capability of responding over multiple operational periods, so it 
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decided to develop three separate groups, each consisting of an IC, his command, and 
general staff.  
ICS requires that all incidents must have an IC. Whether a single-officer police unit 
or a multiple-alarm fire response, all crises must have an established commander with the 
responsibility and authority to commit resources, command actions, and make 
expenditures.170 In ICS, the elected official or department head is not the suitable person 
to fill the IC position. AW recruited three assistant directors, each with enough expertise 
in utility operations and sufficient authority to move resources within an incident as first 
ICs.  
Command staff are aides to the IC and perform functionally specific tasks. They 
are the public information officer, liaison officer, and safety officer. The utility has a Safety 
Division, so it selected personnel from within that group to become the first safety officers. 
The utility also has a marketing and information program, so personnel from that group 
became the first public information officers. In the ordinary course of work, AW interfaces 
with regulatory agencies and the state legislative body, so it selected staff with those 
experiences to serve as liaison officers.  
It is typical for public safety organizations, such as police, fire, and EMS agencies, 
to use ICS. Utilities and other non-typical response entities can lack familiarity and 
expertise in applying the system. AW’s lack of experience led me to create a position not 
routinely included in the command staff structure. We developed a DOC manager position 
to serve as an assistant for the new ICs and provide ICS-specific input and guidance during 
activations. We sought out military veterans who worked for the utility to fill the DOC 
manager role because veterans are comfortable with hierarchy and a chain of command 
and take to the position quickly. I worked closely with these new members to teach them 
ICS and how to apply it. 
The next steps included developing the IMT’s general staff. They are section chiefs 
responsible for the functional aspects of ICS—Finance, Logistics, Operations, and 
                                                 
170 Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the Incident Command System, ICS 
100: Student Manual, IS-0100.c (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2018), 62–65.  
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Planning, or “FLOP,” Sections.171 Three of these sections align well with most 
organizations. Operations involves the work a department does. For AW, this translates to 
treatment, distribution, collections, and support staff. The utility uses operations managers 
in the daily execution of work, so those managers were a natural fit for the OSC roles. We 
recruited six OSCs so that each team could have a primary and back up, called the deputy 
OSC. Deputies must have the same qualifications as their primaries and can replace chiefs 
should the need arise.172 The Finance and Logistics Sections equate with financial services 
and purchasing divisions in almost any department. Existing AW financial services 
personnel were engaged in filling these roles in our IMT.  
The ICS Planning Section is not readily associated with normal organizational 
operations and was a particular challenge for AW to fill. The planning section is directly 
involved with solution planning during a disaster response, responsible for tracking 
information related to all aspects of the activation. I leveraged an occupational role within 
our department—the business process consultant, position—whose expertise involved 
facilitating meetings, managing projects, and explaining business processes to department 
staff. The skills associated with this job title were precisely what we were looking for in 
our Planning Section chiefs.  
With the basic positions filled for our IMT, we initiated the training requirements 
necessary for membership on the team. Each member was required to obtain certification 
through Intermediate ICS. Four basic online courses were prerequisites for the intermediate 
class, which was instructor-led. Once each member completed the individual training, the 
team was brought together as a group for a two-day course in IMT operations. As three 
separate teams, they received instruction and completed tabletop exercises as simulated 
activations. They worked their way through increasingly challenging and complex 
scenarios, applying the principles of ICS.  
With the teams established and trained, we set up a notification and reporting 
system that allowed members to activate in case of an emergency. The emergency 
                                                 
171 Federal Emergency Management Agency.  
172 Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
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management program began a schedule of exercises, intending to provide at least one 
opportunity per year for all members to practice what they had learned. Assumption-based 
plans have been the most effective tool for exercising the IMTs. Scenarios have been 
designed to reflect assumed threats to the utility, and teams work through response options.  
We capture AARs for each exercise and distribute the lessons learned to all 
members. As the IMT has expanded, we continue to provide training and practice 
exercises. The utility has activated the IMT about a half-dozen times over the past four 
years. With each activation and exercise, we improve our ability to respond effectively. 
Entities or jurisdictions can emulate this process to develop their own IMTs.  
Capitalize on talent pools that exist within your department, city, county, or state. 
Emergency management often overlooks potential contributors, as they are not traditional 
first responders. Librarians, auditors, project managers, and many others bring skills and 
behaviors to assist with the Planning Section and other demands. Be creative and inclusive, 
welcome assistance from individuals who want to serve but are not looking to respond in 
the field. 
Two issues this study did not fully address include team size and unit development. 
As the emergency manager for AW, I started small and added to the team as the need arose. 
I recommend team size and unit development as a research subject for future study. At 
AW, the team roster consists of about 10 percent of our total number of employees. A 
future project could research multiple jurisdictions and departments to determine ICS unit 
development recommendations and make suggestions on appropriate staffing depth for 
IMTs. Perhaps staffing levels ought to be a ratio of full-time employees within a given 
jurisdiction or local department and team size might be a fraction of a given population 
served. 
In final summary, agencies, jurisdictions, regions, and all others with crisis 
mitigation and reaction obligations can employ the IMT concept, in addition to pre-incident 
ABP, to better prepare themselves and their constituents. It is my greatest desire that the 
research and analysis provided in the thesis is used to improve upon the national 
preparedness strategy. I hope that the information presented in this work enhances the 
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process of preparing local, state, and other responders nationwide for the inevitable 
disasters that will affect our people and our great nation.  
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